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Introduction 
Emotion and virtue do not seem a likely pairing of concepts for political theory.  Until 
recent years, neither of these terms on its own was a topic of close inquiry – in 
comparison to the attention devoted to such concepts as justice, power, interests and 
rights. Political theorists have been reluctant to examine seemingly personal traits 
and individual experience, preferring to focus upon social relationships and 
institutional practices.  The concept of virtue is met with reluctance, as if one is 
treading upon ground too soft to support a stable framework of intellectual inquiry.  
The same has been true in other disciplines.  In a work bravely devoted to the topic, 
philosopher Philippa Foot (1978, 177) admits to 
a certain discomfort that one may feel when discussing virtues.  It is not easy to put one’s 
finger on what is wrong, but it has something to do with a disparity between the moral 
ideals that may seem to be implied in or talk about the virtues, and the moral judgements 
that we actually make. 
To compound this discomfort, ‘emotional virtue’ seems to be an oxymoron or a 
contradiction in terms.  The emotions have generally been understood in moral and 
philosophical discourse as a ‘problem’ rather than an integral and enabling feature of 
a good and enriching individual and social life. The general tendency has been to 
associate the emotions with a moral failing, a surrender, or indeed a passionate 
detour into vice.  Hence moral inquiry has tended to emphasise the psychologically 
disintegrating and socially malign effects of negative emotions.  In ethical analysis 
the emotions are, for epistemological reasons, relegated as a distraction or an 
irrelevancy, with the focus directed to the act and its consequences rather than the 
complex psychological aspects of agency or personhood.  In any case, in recent years 
theorists have been far keener, perhaps for professional reasons (to win the interests 
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of students and the acceptance of publishers) to write about perversity, moral 
transgression, hatred, terror and violence.  These are far more ‘interesting’ topics, 
surely, than the tame redoubts of felicity, fidelity, prudence and charity – to say 
nothing of chastity, which political theorists are not likely to do. 
Defining Emotion 
The meaning of emotion (animi motus in the Latin) is expressed in the term itself, that 
is, the idea of ‘motion’ in one’s inward feelings and self-consciousness.  These inward 
motions of the ‘soul’ (psyche) signal and give rise to ‘moods,’ inner feelings and 
dispositions.  This self-awareness of the embodied psyche is a matter of feelings not 
thoughts:  not facts or probabilities but the inward feeling, the emotional sense of 
ourselves to ourselves and of our presentation to others. (Elster, 1999, 244-50; 
Goffman, 1956, 1959; Harré & Parrott, 1996, 39-56). 
The severally identified emotions designate how we sense our feelings, how we 
express them and how we are disposed to act in the face of events, things (including 
our own actions and bodily self-presentations) and other people.1  Note the 
important distinction between our disposition and any subsequent action, such as 
contrition, flight or aggression. We experience and display outward signs of the inner 
feeling, as in shame, fear or anger, through familiar and empirically observed 
phenomena.  Altered posture, changes in respiration and blood pressure, flushing or 
pallor, tears and muscular muscular reactions in the face, eyes, hands and arms are 
                                                 
1 Nussbaum (2004,23-24) asserts on behalf of ‘the major emotions’ that ‘there is a large measure of agreement 
about what the category includes’ in both the Western and non-Western traditions, and offers a rough and 
ready list drawn from the ‘philosophical tradition and in related popular and literary thought … joy, grief, 
fear, anger, hatred, pity or compassion, envy, jealousy, hope, guilt, gratitude, shame, disgust and love.’  She 
notes the importance of distinguishing the emotions from ‘bodily appetites such as hunger and thirst, and also 
from objectless moods, such as irritation and certain types of depression.’. My reading of the modern specialist 
psychological and philosophical literature – e.g. Elster (1999), Wollheim (1999), Solomon (1983) and Griffiths 
(1997) – suggests that the emotions, while undeniably real and distinct from other psycho-behavioural 
phenomena, have generally defied consistent, systematic classification, a difficulty that makes them no less real 
and, in the case of psychology, needful of analysis and at times clinical therapy. 
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some of the clinically documented emotional expressions.  These inner motions may 
or may not, depending upon circumstances, lead to externalised motion, but they 
constitute the self-awareness and ‘readiness’ of what we call predispositions.  Strong 
emotions may be expressed outwardly to presumed or actual observers and actors;  
inwardly (to the ‘looking glass self’2 in the case of negative emotions of humiliation, 
guilt and shame);  or generally to groups or classes of things.  They are the ready 
resources drawn upon across a range of ‘rational’ behaviour: to express delight at an 
infant’s smile, to cry out in fear at approaching danger, to feel disgust in the presence 
of putrid waste. 
Vices and the negative emotions have been the main interests for political 
theorists exploring these matters.  Judith Shklar’s Ordinary Vices (1984), a work 
expanding on an earlier paper on hypocrisy and  cruelty, was path-breaking as a 
serious analysis of deviations from the straight and narrow of justice and right 
reason.  Martha Nussbaum has written widely on the emotions, including piety, fear, 
anger, mercy, love and desire.  She plumbed the depths of the negative emotions in 
“‘Secret Sewers of Vice’: Disgust, Bodies and the Law” (Nussbaum 1999), and more 
extensively in Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Nussbaum, 2004), 
works which reflect the tendency to see the emotions as a dangerous problem and a 
threat to justice and the good life.  However Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness: 
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986) is a painstaking reassessment of 
the positive roles attributed to the emotions in ancient philosophy and psychology, 
                                                 
2 This concept originated as a sociological concept describing self-consciousness, self-assessment and self-
restraint in relation to our impression of how others see us (Cooley, 1922).  Psychologists have applied this idea 
to emotional expression in which external experiences are registered internally.  A classic example is the 
distinction between shame or embarrassment, which is expressed externally (by blushing and submissive or 
deferential behaviour), whereas guilt is experienced and expressed inwardly, as if ‘looking at myself in the 
mirror.’ 
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particularly with regard to the formation of good character and the motivation of 
ethical action in the thought of Plato and Aristotle.3  
Why ‘virtue’ and not ‘vice’? 
When political and social theorists, as well as sociologists and psychologists, venture 
onto emotional terrain they tend to explore the affiliation of negative emotions 
(especially anger, fear and hatred) with vice, emphasising the immoral, vicious and 
criminal implications of the passions.4  The strong, unruly emotions of anger and 
envy clearly correspond to the vices of cruelty and avarice, just as love is closely 
associated with hate.  These linkages have been decisively condemned as sin, crime 
(including an entire category: crimes passionels) or other forms of moral opprobrium 
(pride, greed, lust and gluttony inter alia).  For example, the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church (1997) insists that sinful acts are engendered by ‘perverse inclinations which 
cloud conscience and corrupt the concrete judgment of good and evil,’5 and the 
believer is asked to acknowledge that ‘The heart is deceitful above all things, and 
desperately wicked…’ (Jeremiah 17:9). 
One need not deny the vicious potential of the emotions – when the rational mind 
does not ‘govern’ the heart’s pulsating bodily appetites – in order to affirm emotion’s 
virtuous potential.  There is good reason to believe that the needs, appetites and 
desires of the whole body – as they are felt, canalised and expressed through the 
                                                 
3 Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Nussbaum, 2001) explores the emotions in modern philosophy 
and psychology as well as in the turbulent themes of romantic love in modern music and literature.  
Interestingly, its index has numerous references to anger, fear, grief, hatred and shame; none for intelligence or 
virtue. 
4 This literature is discussed in Corcoran (2001, 2003). 
5 The Catechism identifies the ‘principal passions’ as ‘love and hatred, desire and fear, joy, sadness and anger’ 
(§1772). The ‘capital sins’ are vices that are linked or opposed to the Cardinal Virtues, prudence, justice, 
fortitude and temperance (§§1805-09).  The vices Capital Vices are pride, avarice, envy, wrath, lust, gluttony and 
sloth or acedia’ (§1866). 
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emotions – animate and sustain virtuous action, or what Aristotle calls acts ‘worthy 
of praise.’6 
This proposition, I believe, can be advanced even with regard to the classical 
virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice.  Thymos, the font of emotion, is for 
Plato the ‘spirited’ element equally present in the soul, the body and the state.  It 
provides energia, orexis7 (a ‘reaching out,’ ‘stretching to,’ wanting or grasping 
inherent in all animal movement) and resistance for the whole of life.  It is a force not 
simply governed, tempered or repressed (as the appetites may require), but is the 
vehicle, the means of action by which the soul’s wisdom and ruling principles are 
given effect. Thus courage is, among the cardinal virtues,8 primarily an emotional 
disposition: an ‘excellence’ that is driven by passionate regard for one’s comrades 
and fellow-citizens in the face of danger.9  In the heat and dust of battle, the 
courageous soldier must ‘keep his head.’  He must neither flee in cowardly retreat or 
foolhardily expose his own life and the lives of his battalion to destruction.  But 
clearly the courageous soldier’s pulse races and his senses are heightened for 
endurance and explosive action.  His comradely awareness is palpable.  Such a 
solider is neither insane (‘off his head’) nor a robotic ‘killing machine.’ 
                                                 
6 Philosophical and psychological studies agree that emotions are clearly distinguishable from instinctual and 
appetitive forces: Nussbaum (1986, 2004), de Sousa (1987), Stocker (1996). 
7 Nussbaum, (1986, 273-76) discusses Aristotle’s original use of orexis as a unifying concept to explain ‘animal 
action’ in rational as well as non-rational forms of ‘response’ to the external world. 
8 Cardinal derives from the Latin: both the ‘hinge’ (cardo) upon which all else hangs, thus of foremost, principal or 
paramount importance. 
9 Noting the soldier’s passionate courage does not deny nor diminish the statesman and general’s excellence of 
wisdom.  Their knowledge and capacity for abstraction are critical in determining the necessity of attack, timing, 
weaponry, likelihood of victory and alternative strategies of engagement.  Yet even this wisdom is difficult to 
conceive in the absence of a range of emotional dispositions: the ‘inspirited’ sense of honour and courage, the 
warmth of patriotism against a common enemy. 
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The emotional substance of the moral virtues is even more pronounced.  This is 
true of the virtues of practical ethical action analysed by Aristotle in Nicomachean 
Ethics as well as the seven primary virtues of Christian theology.10  
In both the Aristotelian and Christian ethical systems, the moral virtues are said 
to arise from careful formation, the emulation of excellent models, balance, 
moderation and practice.  What this envisions is not the simple model of a rational 
head governing the implacable body.  Rather, it describes the gradual habituation11 
of a person’s growth, self-regulation and experience in developing the skills (the 
arëtai) appropriate to a well-lived and happy life.  This is not to suggest that bodily 
restraint and the conquest of passion constitute the principal idea Aristotle had in 
mind, much less Christian theologians (for whom it was certainly not).  Indeed, this 
was not even the case for the Epicureans, for whom bodily feelings were indicative of 
the principal goods of life. Nevertheless, even for the Epicureans, for whom rational 
principles were necessary and decisive, apathëia12 was preferable to the more active 
and turbulent passions. 
Each of these ancient ethical system presupposes the ability to acquire a ‘feel’ for 
what is good, true, excellent and healthy, as well as the capacity to exercise these 
abilities freely and in conformity to self- and communal esteem.  What intuitively 
guides, encourages, sustains and reinforces virtuous behaviour is not the forceful 
reins of the rational faculty or the supervision of our lives by an intellectual 
                                                 
10 The particular distinctions between Plato’s divisions of arete, Aristotle’s dianoetic and moral ethike, and 
Christianity’s cardinal (prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude) and capital virtues (humility, generosity, love, 
kindness, chastity, faith, zeal; all in turn opposed to the ‘seven deadly sins’) need not dictate the present 
discussion.  The modes of classification are never entirely straightforward.  For example, Aquinas seems to 
confuse the matter: ‘those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal [cardinal] virtues.’ 
Summa theologica, I-II, Q. 61, Art. 1. 
11 Aristotle’s word for this formation – ″εξις (hexis) – suggests how the moral virtues are formed not by a self-
conscious rational will but by gradual, sub-conscious habituation. 
12 More specifically, not simply a ‘lack of feeling’ but aponia (lack of pain), ataraxia (imperturbability) and 
katastematikos (tranquil). 
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monitoring of active consciousness or external authority.  Rather, the virtues are 
practiced because they give expression to our feelings (of fairness, honesty, generosity, 
well-being) and desires (for praise, solidarity with our fellows, pleasure in shared 
kindness, affection and esteem).  We tend to say that we know these things in our 
heart.  They are our heart’s desire. 
Clearly, then, the contradiction and supposed dichotomy between the mind and 
the body, and the mind’s moral sovereignty over the flesh, is not the full story.  Even 
in the Platonic and Christian combat between spirit and the flesh, virtue’s necessary 
triumph over the body’s demonic slavery is not necessarily passionless.13  Ancient 
tribute, both in philosophy and religion, is paid to the heart:  its wisdom, truth, 
ingenuity, honesty, fairness and steadfastness.  Similar tribute is paid to the senses in 
ordinary discourse in such phrases as ‘it just feels right,’ or the expression that one 
‘just felt that this was the right thing to do.’  Such a feeling does not derive logically 
from a principle of reason, nor is it motivated (that is, ‘moved’) by factual 
information.  It is, rather, quite possibly the opposite.  We tend to say: on the spur of 
the moment, the courage to act ‘came from within.’ 
The argument I make here, then, suggests that the virtues are embodied actions.  
They are not (only, or always) actions informed by precepts of reason or motivated 
by logical inferences.  Rather, I am suggesting that the emotional ‘content’ of human 
action is not inchoate, destructive or inimical to the content of rational activity. 
Rather, a person’s inward feelings, dispositions and outward expressions – the 
‘motions’ experienced inwardly and expressed by physiological signs and motor 
                                                 
13 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the complexity of how virtue, and in particular, the intellectual 
virtues, were conceived and given virtual representation in art from ancient Greece through the early modern 
period.  Suffice it to say that Wisdom, Temperance and Justice, as well as personifications of Theory and War, 
were typically rendered in female form. 
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actions – are themselves components and dynamic resources of what is good, right 
and praiseworthy to do.  The inner promptings of emotions incline us to do things 
which, on rational or utilitarian calculations, may be risky or sacrificial, and enable us 
to keep doing them, nobly, even heroically, until it is sacrifice indeed.  The head and 
the heart are not at war;  they are not from different planets.  And it follows that 
virtues are not the trophies of reason’s conquest over emotion.14 
The Standard Account 
In arguing for the importance – indeed, the very existence – of emotional virtues it is 
appropriate to recall that, from a traditional perspective, the idea of pairing virtue 
and emotion is a psychological, philosophical and moral contradiction.  The 
prejudice, if I may call it that, against an emotional dimension in virtue is not simply 
an oversight.  Also at work are conceptual obstacles and misunderstandings in 
several academic disciplines – in particular philosophy, political theory and, more 
particularly, feminist theory – that have obscured the importance and prominence of 
‘the passions’ in the Western philosophical and moral tradition.15 To make short 
work of what I take to be familiar theoretical territory, I will offer a number of fairly 
sweeping generalisations about the way in which the philosophical tradition has 
conceptualised emotion (or ‘passion’) and virtue.  By doing so, I reproduce an 
interpretation – an elaborately dichotomous Standard Account – that James (1997) 
has, I believe, rightly undermined.  I paint it here with broad brushstrokes for the 
                                                 
14 A frequent theme in ancient and Renaissance art effectively reverses that image, casting Virtue as the militant 
figure of noble action:  ‘Virtue Conquering Fortune’ (or Occasio). 
15 I owe this large and perhaps controversial proposition to Susan James’s excellent book, Passion and Action: The 
Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (1997).  Its eye-opening scholarship sets forth extensive evidence of 
the central role of the passions in the Western religious and philosophical tradition, and consistently so from the 
ancient Greeks.  James especially illustrates how the cental role of the passions in seventeenth-century 
philosophy gave way to a reception and re-interpretation of  seventeenth-century philosophy bedevilled by a 
dualistic ‘mind-body problem.’ James suggests that this is ‘partly due to the influence of Hume and other 
Enlightenment thinkers, who represented the seventeenth century as an era dominated by dogmatic, religious 
values in which a proper appreciation of sentiment was suppressed’ (15). Works that have addressed these 
matters from other perspectives include Solomon (1983, 1995) and Wollheim (1999). 
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rhetorical purpose of illustrating the easy familiarity of this orthodoxy.  Readers 
variously informed will note exceptions to, as well as weaknesses of, various 
simplifications and strained stereotypes.16  For example, there were interesting cases 
of medieval and early modern Christian mystics burned at the stake for their 
insistence upon the passionate and deeply embodied spiritual union with the Divine. 
Thus:  virtue and emotion have generally been conceptualised as residing on 
opposing sides of a dichotomy separating the mind and body, a dichotomy 
presupposed in their ‘structural’ elements in psychology and physiology as well as in 
their behavioural and moral effects.  This has been the case since Socrates and Plato 
established the priority and necessity of the intellectual governance of the individual 
soul – the rule of reason – over the unruly spirits and appetites of the natural body 
and the body politic.  Intellectual, epistemological and moral implications flow from 
that opposition, an advised term freighted with meanings not captured by averring 
that the mind and body are simply separate or distinct. The relationship, already 
dramatically explicated by Plato in the Crito and Euthyphro, was subsequently 
clarified and indeed institutionalised as it resounded through the long tradition of 
pagan Hellenism (both Stoicism and Epicureanism), Christian scholasticism, and 
continuing into Enlightenment rationalism. 
In this view the body’s potency (potentia, power) was relentless, dangerous, 
threatening, sinful and recalcitrant.  Such a force called out (from mind’s intellect, the 
                                                 
16 James (1997, 17-20) describes in some detail how ‘artfully constructed’ oppositions, dualisms and dichotomies 
in relation to mind and body, reason and feeling, have been strategically effective, particularly in feminist 
theory,’ but this comes at the cost of interpretations that falsify the philosophical tradition that is being 
‘demonized.’  James argues that a careful study of what these early modern philosophers actually wrote about 
the central importance of the passions in human thought and reason serve ‘to vindicate [the passions’] 
importance within early-modern philosophy.’  ‘By sharply splitting off reason from passion, [modern 
commentators on Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Pascal, Malebranche and Spinoza, inter alia] have generated a 
parodic interpretation of the processes by which knowledge is attained, and have obscured from view a fruitful 
conception of the emotional character of learning and the role of the passions in rational thought and action’ 
(16-17). 
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logos of thought and speech) for the constraint, training, repression and conquest by 
the rational, divine, superior element that men (far more clearly than women) luckily 
possessed.  Hence the simple but great predicaments, calling for great controls, of 
human life: mind over body, head over heart, reason over passion, thought over 
action.17  This was the divinely instituted, natural order of things when nature’s 
hierarchy was copied into principles of custom, law, theology and morality by which 
human life was justly ordered and rightly lived. 
Nevertheless, the Standard Account does coherently align the strongest and most 
visible threads of the Western philosophical and moral tradition, weaving the raw 
fabric which supported the embroidery of Western law, politics and moral 
conventions.  For example, there was an assumed coherence of reason and morality.  
Moral virtue was, in effect, the product of a robust, developed expression of a 
rational mind.  The will, when it was virtuous and good, was so because it was the 
servant of reason. 
The triumphant achievement of Christian scholasticism was to reconcile reason 
and faith.  One might say this was a dangerous, passionate faith in supernatural things 
embraced in defiance of the poor powers of philosophy’s reason.18  Thomas Aquinas 
boldly rescued the faculty of reason from its Augustinian relegation to its woeful 
status as a sin of prideful vanity.  Aquinas’s enlightened image – ‘Christ is perfect 
                                                 
17 It is only fair to acknowledge two notable exceptions to this view.  David Hume (1875, II, 195), despite pride in 
his own cool temper, recognised the great influence of passion on custom and habit:  ‘Reason is, and ought only 
to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.’  His 
contemporary, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1973, 55), also famously observed, if with uncharacteristic moderation: 
‘Whatever moralists may hold, the human understanding is greatly indebted to the passions, which, it is 
universally allowed, are also much indebted to the understanding.’ 
18 Credo, quia absurdum est, widely misattributed to the early Christian theologian Tertullian (c. 160-220 CE), as 
well as to Augustine, is the purest expression of this idea.  Tertullian did write: ‘The Son of God died; it is 
credible because it is improbable. He was buried and rose again; this is certain because it is impossible’ (De carne 
Christi 5.4). Discussed in Osborn (1997), Chapter 3. 
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Man’19 – is virtually the photographic positive of St. Augustine’s dark medieval 
negative: human nature as an utterly depraved, sinful and fallen creature.  Thus for 
Aquinas, human reason, in its highest expression in philosophy, can attain to a 
‘science of God’ (i.e. theology).20  Rational philosophy adds to mere faith and is 
needful in the Church’s stewardship of the simple flock whose lives need the 
guidance of principles they could not discover or independently comprehend.21 
Similarly, the Standard Account provided what seemed a reasonable 
understanding of the special differences and defects of women.  Dating to Aristotle 
and seldom spelled out because it was the standard view, reason was the ‘male 
principle,’ while the body was the ‘female principle.’  This view accorded with all the 
associated concepts of nature’s organization in hierarchies, the male’s supposed 
superiority of strength and readiness to action, and the female’s generative and 
maternal functions.  Sometimes referred to as the ‘one sex’ theory of human nature 
(Gould, 1991; Laqueur, 1990), the male was the archetype: complete, strong, fully 
developed both in mind and body.  The female was the associate or complement of 
the archetype: necessarily different, weaker in mind and body due to incomplete 
development, and by nature functional and subordinate.22 
This sense of differentiation drew upon a multifarious range of ideas and 
prejudices, from Homeric tales and Aristotelian anatomy to Judæo-Christian texts 
and practices, ancient law and customs, and the apparently ‘universal’ experience of 
all races and species.  The ancient strands of the Standard Account, therefore, were 
                                                 
19 The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas, Roman Catechism, Fourth Article, 6. 
20 Summa theologica Part I, Qu. 1.5 
21 Not a bad trick, and one of a rather greater and more enduring influence compared to more recent professors of 
philosophy at the University of Paris. 
22 Carol Gilligan (1982, 2-7; 6-9; 73) note how this developmental archetype continues into the modern era, 
especially in Freudian psychoanalytical theory, but also in other powerful conceptual distinctions in morality 
and language use. 
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incorporated in Western philosophy’s deduction that female reason, being naturally 
weaker and defective, placed women in an eccentric position with regard to morality 
and virtue.  Their morality was inevitably stunted and flawed, making them needful 
of closer and life-long supervision by men.  It was entirely to be expected that 
women would be recalcitrant, passionate, and have aims that, in the expression of 
these feelings, would inevitably be irrational and detrimental to the peace of the 
household and, by implication, of the body politic.  Their passions, whether negative 
or positive, were powerful and often directed toward, and powerfully attractive to, 
men. It must therefore be assumed that such passions were dangerous and in need of 
careful governance.  Not only might their wiles and intrigues subvert the rule of 
reason, their essential service to the peace, virtue, comfort and future of the state 
must be safely preserved.23 
Though their reason was defective and their morality suspect, it could not be 
denied that women, when well-governed, were capable of exhibiting manifest 
virtues that greatly enriched civilised life.  Thus ‘feminine virtues’ were long 
associated with the Christian names given to girls.  Only several are now 
interestingly archaic:  Charity, Constance, Patience, Prudence, Felicity, Mercy, 
Chastity, Modesty, Faith, Hope and Joy.  These were the praiseworthy moral virtues 
or excellences of habit that all might develop. They complemented what the ancient 
philosophers distinguished as the ‘manly’ (in the Latin, virtü) intellectual or ‘cardinal’ 
excellences.  Wisdom, courage, fortitude and justice were understood to be expressed 
                                                 
23 Again Rousseau (1973, 36-37) provides a tantalising variation on the Standard Account: ‘Amiable and virtuous 
daughters of Geneva, it will always be the lot of your sex to govern ours.  Happy are we, so long as your chaste 
influence, solely exercised within the limits of conjugal union, is exerted only for the glory of the State and the 
happiness of the public.… It is you task to perpetuate, by your insinuating influence and your innocent and 
amiable rule, a respect for the laws of the State , and harmony among the citizens…. Continue, therefore, always 
to be what you are, the chaste guardians of our morals, and the sweet security of our peace, exerting on every 
occasion the privileges of the heart and of nature, in the interests of duty and virtue.’ 
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in educational attainments, resolve, public action and victorious strength,24 while the 
female virtues suggested self-restraint, submission and renunciation, as well as the 
inclination to be compliant, pleasing and supportive of others. 
Here we have a rather blurred mapping of the relations between the emotions 
and the virtues, with the territory traced and divided by gender.  This gave, as it 
were, a sexual valence to rationality and passion. 
It hardly needs mentioning today that these dichotomies (mind/body, 
reason/passion, public/private) have been greatly publicised, widely attacked and 
fairly well subdued in Western intellectual circles. The gendered presuppositions, 
together with their hierarchies and power relations, have been as widely discredited 
as Aristotle’s understanding of biological reproduction and female anatomy.  
Similarly, rationality and the ‘products’ of reason have been vigorously 
‘deconstructed,’ even if, as James (1997) has argued, the attacks have at times 
underwritten and adopted – in theories of ‘difference’ – the very methodological 
presuppositions and problems being attacked.  
Yet it seems clear enough that theoretical inquiry in moral philosophy, as well as 
in wider political and moral discourse, does not consistently deviate from the 
conceptual parallel between reason (‘the rational’) and virtue as (‘good and right 
action’).  Even in contemporary public discourse, concepts of justice, the good life 
and virtue have survived independently of virtue’s embarrassing etymology.  Things 
are still deprecated or praised in sensual, passionate terms.  Bad ideas and persons 
are hot-headed, weak, wet and soft.  By contrast, ‘rational’ policies, choices and 
actions are praised as cool, strong, hard-headed and even ‘muscular.’ 
                                                 
24 Even male temperance carried with it the connotation of overweening strength for self-control and self-
regulation in the face of external or appetitive temptations. 
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Moral Virtues 
What if we reverse the priority of the cardinal virtues and give pride of place to the 
moral virtues?  Instead of focusing on what Aristotle called the dianoetic or 
intellectual virtues, I suggest a re-evaluation of the moral virtues (aretai ëthikai).  
These are the excellences of individual action acquired by experience and entrenched 
as habits.  The moral virtues need not be understood as a domain of human action 
diametrically opposed to the intellectual nor in denial of the importance of the cardinal 
virtues as bearings of society’s institutional framework.  The moral virtues are simply 
valuable qualities of actions, laudably appraised, occurring in personal and social 
relationships.  In the classical idiom, they are dispositions and behaviours 
contributing to ‘the good and happy life.’  These are the emotional virtues in the sense 
that they give active expression to an emotion supportive of a socially prized moral 
excellence (arëtë).  Such virtues are expressive and responsive, the very opposite of 
what Stocker (1996, xix) describes as the ‘invisibility’ of emotion in cool, rational 
calculation, or the ‘absence’ of passion’s conquest.25 
The importance of this revaluation is implicit in challenging the neatly 
dichotomous alignment of reason and feeling with virtue and vice.  To focus upon 
aretai ëthikai does not diminish or subvert the intellectual excellences.  We still look 
for the cardinal virtues to be reflected in decisive and just policy making, for 
example, and hope for it to be epitomised in courageous and wise political 
leadership.  Wistfully, we wish that leaders – for example Bill Clinton, with regard to 
                                                 
25 The distinction I have in mind can be illustrated by a comparison. The Stoic will urge us to ‘choke back our 
tears’ to achieve calm, rational indifference and imperturbability (ataraxia) in the face of injury, loss or 
misfortune; whereas the exponent of emotional virtue will, in the identical circumstance, counsel us to show 
merciful tears, freely flowing, to express grief and share the sorrow of others.  Rather than the ‘womanish 
counsel’ of Christian morality – charity, mercy, and humility – ridiculed by Roman patriots, this is an opening 
to what Dominic Stefanson’s doctoral research has usefully pointed out as the readiness to tears common in 
Homeric heroes on the field of battle. 
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temperance – actually did exemplify them.  Nevertheless, it is plain enough that our 
daily aspirations and appraisals adhere to quieter, less heroic virtues of honesty, 
patience, prudence, modesty, generosity, charity, hopefulness, love, affection, kindness, loyalty 
and felicity.26 
Do we gain anything by refusing to designate emotional dispositions and habits 
as ‘virtues’?  Could we honestly deny that some persons and some acts exemplify 
these characteristics better than others? 
For purposes of argument, I concede the intent of these rhetorical questions.  
Good deeds are in fact done.  Some people are more likely than others to perform 
them.  In such cases, our personal, familial, neighbourly, vocational and political 
relationships are enriched and improved.  We extol and benefit from those who 
embody and enact these virtues, and we regret their absence.  We easily recognise 
these virtues as the deeds of an excellent citizen, a person ‘good and true’ rather than 
a superhuman hero or a saint, although these terms are not uncommonly used to 
describe exemplary individuals. 
Though we may take these things for granted, it remains for me to establish the 
emotional element of these virtues. 
I lay to one side the Socratic challenge that it is rational – an inexorable 
intellectual imperative – to be honest, charitable and altruistic.27  I believe a 
confirmation may be forthcoming to that proposition, but it is beside the point of my 
present argument. 
                                                 
26 As this analysis advances beyond the scope of this paper, I will examine how virtues relate to the concepts of 
trust and social capital that have been developed by such social theorists and Robert Putnam (2000) and Francis 
Fukuyama (1995). I anticipate that the presuppositions, or at least implications, of their ideas are more strongly 
linked to rationalistic conceptions of calculation, negotiation and contract: what Habermas called ‘strategic 
rationality,’ even if these relations are enacted on an emotional foundation of identity, recognition and 
communal sensibility.  
27 The ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ is perhaps the most familiar example of the moral futility of rational choice theory. 
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Rather, I simply indicate that ‘emotion’ is the initiating, driving and sustaining force 
of the moral virtues. An immediate implication of such an argument is to resist, and 
indeed bridge, the classic dichotomy which opposes reason and emotion.  The 
venerable proposition that reason more perfectly rules when the emotions are 
subdued, it seems to me, is wrong.  It misperceives the place of emotion in our moral 
choices and depreciates their force in our resolve to act accordingly.  Propositions 
similar to these have been argued extensively in very recent years by intellectual 
historians, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and physiologists.  This 
growing body of work is not yet large.  Its wider impact is perhaps gradual because 
of the complexity and specialisation of the material in question, ranging across 
broadly based exegesis of philosophical texts, clinical and experimental psychology 
and scientific methodology.28  The arguments presented here serve, admittedly, as 
evidence of the reluctance of political theory to acknowledge this influence and to 
overcome the longstanding resistance to acknowledging and re-examining the role of 
emotion and ‘the passions’ in thinking, knowing, judging and, especially, in political 
rule.29 
Conclusion 
I have caricatured the Standard Account of the passions as the implacable, 
incorrigible, insatiable mob over whom Reason must compel its absolute empire.  It 
must do this, purportedly, by a powerful force, the Rational Will, which emanates 
                                                 
28 The works which I have drawn upon in forming these views are Griffiths (1997), James (1997), Stocker (1996), 
de Sousa (1987).  I am aware of, but have not greatly relied on, the works of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio 
(1995, 1999, 2003).  His works discuss the processes of brain function, thinking, feeling, body consciousness and 
emotions, endeavouring to reinterpret the views of cognition and consciousness developed by philosophers 
such as Descartes and Spinoza.  Damasio’s works are usefully, and critically, reviewed in Hacking (2004).  
29 Even Nussbaum (2004), in whose work the emotions have been the central subjects, makes the burden of her 
later study a carefully forensic and ‘rational’ approach to the propriety of shame, fear, disgust and anger in law 
and legal procedure. 
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mysteriously from the intellect, and may or not be ultimately authorised by the 
Divine Will. 
There have been important dissenters30 from the Standard Account among 
political thinkers, but until recent decades such dissent gave little if any quarter 
either to the importance of the role of emotion or the virtues in developing their 
theories of what social life is or ought to be.  I refer here, for example, to Jeremy 
Bentham and Utilitarianism, but also to materialists such as Hobbes more generally.  
For these thinkers, the empire to whose throne we are chained (the image is 
Bentham’s own31) is governed by pleasure and pain.  Bentham makes no secret of the 
fact that he scorns any idea of virtue and denies any coherent meaning to the 
emotions.  They are, he feels, as nonsensical as the idea of natural rights. 
There is a temptation to make a list of emotional virtues, simply for purposes of 
clarity, order and simplicity.  The influence of Aristotle’s example of logical 
classification is strong,32 responding not only to the desire for an orderly 
comprehension, but also arising from the critic’s desire to find flaws in a system.  I 
am not the first one to note that these desires are frustrated, or enhanced, in the face 
of so many classificatory schemes for the virtues.  Indeed, the same point has been 
made about the emotions.  In fact, it is not terribly important, except perhaps from an 
aesthetic standpoint, to have a definitive list and a sharp set of categories for the 
virtues.  Neither virtues nor emotions are natural objects or created artefacts.  They 
                                                 
30 The rejection of stereotypical mind/body, reason/passion, male/female dichotomies has been comprehensively 
argued by several contemporary philosophers (de Sousa, Griffiths), physiologists (Panksepps) and 
neurophysiologists (Damasio). In certain respects their work has anticipated or rendered obsolescent 
epistemological arguments by some feminist political theorists. 
31 Bentham (1823, 17). 
32 Classification was an important feature of Aristotle’s method, and the astonishing range of his application of  
this method established field of science from astronomy to zoology. 
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are not ideals corresponding to some acknowledged set of universal moral or 
metaphysical principles. 
Given the understanding of both vices and virtues as types of socialised 
habituation, we should not be surprised that different cultures may foster distinctive 
identities and emphases with regard to what is excellent and praiseworthy.33  
Importantly, however, psychologists as well as physiologists have generally agreed 
that the human emotions, while also exhibiting some historical and cultural 
fluctuations, are remarkably stable and have even been described as universal 
(Griffiths, 1997, 55-64; Nussbaum, 2004, 23).  Thus, on the hypothesis that there must 
be an intimate connection between the emotions and the moral virtues, it is 
unsurprising that attempts have been made to establish an inclusive classification of 
virtues. I have already mentioned and loosely relied upon Platonic and Aristotelian 
typologies of human excellence and the Roman Catholic’s rather unstable but 
doctrinally useful Cardinal and Capital Virtues corresponding to the equally 
indeterminate Seven Deadly Sins. 
None, of course, is entirely satisfying or convincing. 
I raise these ambiguities not simply to justify an escape from producing yet 
another classification, but to point out that the specific virtues which certain writers 
or traditions valorise are a function of the purpose for which that collection is drawn 
together.  That purpose may be the celebration of the ideals of a warrior state; an 
attempt, in support of religion, to identify counterexamples to sins and taboos; a 
                                                 
33 For example, in the First Century Roman Empire, several emerging Christian virtues (mercy, forgiveness, 
patience and charity toward the odious and the enemy) were deemed to be unpatriotic, shameful cowardice and 
corrupting vices. 
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theory of political justice; or to define and identify ‘other-regarding virtues’ 
(McCullough, 2004). 
In recent years, political thinkers and students of society more widely have 
begun to focus on interpersonal, moral and civic values.  We read increasingly about 
the importance, and often the depletion, or absence, of trust, honesty, loyalty, 
intimacy, generosity, kindness, love, attachment – and simply the felicitous smile of 
recognition and humane respect for those we might care about rather than (as in 
other eras and places) shun as enemies.  Political theorists, it seems to me, have 
tended to approach these things from the intellectual heights of justice, rights and the 
somewhat pallid platform of liberalism and pluralism.  I think they have not got very 
far, possibly because they have charted all the territory as far as these concepts reach.  
So there remains an important challenge to think seriously about the emotions and 
the moral virtues that consolidate rather than divide.  The task is to do this in a way 
that extends our intellectual framework, rather than seeming to abandon it. 
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